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ABSTRACT
In recent financial crises and in recent theoretical studies of them, abrupt declines in capital inflows,
or sudden stops, have been linked with large drops in output. Do sudden stops cause output drops?
No, according to a standard equilibrium model in which sudden stops are generated by an abrupt
tightening of a country's collateral constraint on foreign borrowing. In this model, in fact, sudden
stops lead to output increases, not decreases. An examination of the quantitative effects of a well-
known sudden stop, in Mexico in the mid-1990s, confirms that a drop in output accompanying a
sudden stop cannot be accounted for by the sudden stop alone. To generate an output drop during
a financial crisis, as other studies have done, the model must include other economic frictions which




















erm@ellen.mpls.frb.fed.usRecent ﬁnancial crises in emerging markets have included two features: abrupt declines
in capital inﬂows, commonly known as sudden stops (Guillermo Calvo, 1998), and large
declines in output. Here we ask whether theory predicts that these two features are related;
do sudden stops necessarily lead to output drops? We ask this in a standard equilibrium
model in which sudden stops are generated by an abrupt tightening of a country’s collateral
constraint on foreign borrowing. Theory’s answer is no; sudden stops, by themselves, do not
lead to decreases in output, but rather to increases. To generate an output drop during a
ﬁnancial crisis, the model must include other frictions which have negative eﬀects on output
that are large enough to overwhelm the positive eﬀect of the sudden stop.
We begin by setting up a standard model of a small open economy in which foreign
borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint. We view ﬂuctuations in this collateral con-
straint as arising from ﬂuctuations in a country’s reputation. In the model, the country’s
budget constraint implies that an abrupt decrease in capital inﬂows produces an abrupt in-
crease in net exports. Following our earlier approach (in V. V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe, and
Ellen McGrattan, 2004), we show that the equilibrium outcomes in the small open economy
are equivalent to those of a closed-economy prototype growth model of the kind widely used
in the business cycle literature. In particular, we show that a rise in net exports in the small
open economy corresponds to a rise in government consumption in the prototype model. It
is well known that an increase in government consumption produces an increase in output
in models like our prototype growth model. A sudden stop that produces an increase in net
exports in the small open economy thus also leads to an increase in output. We demonstrate
this quantitatively with data from Mexico in the mid-1990s.
In three other studies, researchers have built small open-economy business cycle modelsin which sudden stops lead to output drops. In these studies, however, output drops because
of other frictions that overwhelm the direct eﬀect on output from sudden stops. In all three
studies, ﬁrms must borrow in advance to pay for inputs to production. In Pablo Neumeyer
and Fabrizio Perri (2004), ﬁrms must borrow to pay for a fraction of the wage bill, while
in Lawrence Christiano, Christopher Gust, and Jorge Roldos (2004) and Enrique Mendoza
(2004), ﬁrms must borrow to pay for foreign intermediate inputs. This payment-in-advance
requirement, by itself, does not introduce a friction because ﬁrms can simply borrow at
the market interest rate to make the payments. In Neumeyer and Perri (2004) and Mendoza
(2004), the key friction is that ﬁrms are eﬀectively required to put the funds in a non—interest-
bearing escrow account. In Neumeyer and Perri, this requirement introduces a wedge between
the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption. In Mendoza, this requirement produces a shock to total factor productivity.
In Christiano, Gust, and Roldos, the payment-in-advance requirement interacts with the
collateral constraint to produce a shock to total factor productivity. Here we demonstrate in
a version of our model that the output drops in these studies are not due to the sudden stops
alone.
I. Collateral Constraints
Here we develop a model with a collateral constraint facing a small open economy.
We show that equilibrium allocations in this original model coincide with those in a closed-
economy prototype growth model with shocks to government consumption. Speciﬁcally, a
decline in net exports resulting from a tightening of the collateral constraint corresponds to
a rise in government consumption in the prototype growth model.
2A. Original Economy
Consider the following model of a small open economy embedded in a world economy
with a single homogenous good in each period. The economy experiences one of ﬁnitely many
events st, which index the shocks. We denote by st =( s0,...,s t) the history of events up
through and including period t. The probability, as of period 0, of any particular history st
is π(st). The initial realization s0 is given.




















where b(st+1) denotes the amount of state-contingent debt, or borrowing from the rest of the
world by the country in period t, q(st+1) denotes the corresponding state-contingent price,
and k(st) denotes the capital stock chosen in period t for use in period t +1 . The country
faces a collateral constraint on borrowing of
b(s
t+1) ≤ V (st+1), (3)
where the maximal amount of borrowing V (st+1) depends on the shock in period t +1 . To
avoid Ponzi schemes, we assume that V (st+1) is uniformly bounded above. The constraint
(3) implies that having more collateral allows the country to borrow more. We interpret
shocks to this collateral constraint as arising from changes in the relationship between the
country and international ﬁnancial markets (or the country’s ﬁnancial reputation).
3The government of this country maximizes the utility of the representative consumer
(1) subject to the country’s budget constraint (2) and collateral constraint (3). The world







An equilibrium for the original economy is a set of allocations (c(st),k(st),l(st),b(st+1)) and
prices (q(st)) such that these allocations solve the government’s problem and the prices satisfy
the arbitrage condition (4).
In this economy, a sudden stop is deﬁned as an abrupt increase in net exports. Here,








Thus, a sudden stop is equivalently deﬁned as an abrupt decrease in new borrowing. From
(3), we know that a sudden drop in V (st+1) leads to a drop in b(st+1) and, when the collateral
constraint is binding, to a sudden stop.
To understand how the collateral constraint aﬀects the equilibrium, consider the ﬁrst-
order conditions of the government’s problem. Let β
t+1π(st+1)µ(st+1) be the multiplier on
the collateral constraint, so that µ(st+1) is positive when the collateral constraint is binding
























Notice that the collateral constraint does not distort either the ﬁrst-order condition (6), gov-
erning labor supply, or the intertemporal Euler equation (7), governing capital accumulation.
As can be seen from (8), the collateral constraint aﬀects only the intertemporal marginal rate
of substitution in consumption.
B. Associated Prototype Economy
Now consider a closed-economy prototype model with an exogenous stochastic variable,
government consumption g(st), which we call the government consumption wedge.I n t h i s













where w(st),r (st), and T(st) are the wage rate, the capital rental rate, and the lump-sum
transfers. In each state st, ﬁrms choose k and l to maximize F(k,l) − r(st)k − w(st)l.T h e
















An equilibrium of the prototype economy consists of allocations (c(st),k(st),l(st),g(st),T(st))
and prices (w(st),r(st)) such that these allocations are optimal for consumers and ﬁrms and
t h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed.
5The following proposition shows that the government consumption wedge in the pro-
totype economy consists of net exports in the original economy:
Proposition 1. Consider an equilibrium of (c(st),k(st),l(st),b(st+1)) and (q(st)) for the original
















let the wage and capital rental rates be w(st)=Fl(st) and r(st)=Fk(st), and let the lump-
sum transfers T(st) be deﬁned by (10). Then the allocations (c(st),k(st),l(st),g(st),T(st))
and the prices (w(st),r(st)) are an equilibrium for the prototype economy.
Proof.T h e ﬁrst-order conditions for the prototype economy are (6) and (7). Under
the construction of the government consumption wedge in (12), the resource constraint (11)
is equal to (2). The proposition then follows. Q.E.D.
Now consider a sudden stop, as in the original economy. In the prototype economy,
this sudden stop manifests itself as an abrupt increase in the government consumption wedge.
As is well known from the business cycle literature, an increase in government consumption
by itself leads to an increase in labor and an increase in output. (See, for example, S. Rao
Aiyagari, Lawrence Christiano, and Martin Eichenbaum, 1992.) Thus, in this economy, a
sudden stop does not generate an output drop; it generates an output rise.
Note that for simplicity we have abstracted from any government consumption in
the original economy. If we let the original economy have government consumption, then
the government consumption wedge in the prototype economy is the sum of government
consumption and net exports in the original economy.
6Note also that given an equilibrium in the prototype economy, we can construct the
associated equilibrium in the original economy if Uc(st)/βR − Uc(st+1) is nonnegative for
all st+1 for some choice of R>1. This R serves as the world interest rate in the original
economy, and at such an R, the multiplier on the collateral constraint is nonnegative. In this
constructed equilibrium, the value of the initial debt in the original economy is set equal to
t h ep r e s e n td i s c o u n t e dv a l u eo fg o v e r n m e n tc o n s u m p t i o ni nt h ep r o t o t y p ee c o n o m y .T h ed e b t
in the original economy at state st is, of course, the present discounted value of net exports
and, hence, in the prototype economy corresponds to the present discounted value of future
government consumption.
Proposition 1 is closely related to a proposition in our earlier work (Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan, 2004). In that proposition, we consider an original economy with no collateral
constraint but with a ﬂuctuating world interest rate. We establish a similar equivalence
proposition there. In the original economy, ﬂuctuations in the world interest rate lead to
ﬂuctuations in net exports. In the prototype economy, these ﬂuctuations in net exports show
up as ﬂuctuations in the government consumption wedge.
C. Extensions to Uncontingent Asset Markets
Consider now a version of the original economy in which we replace the state-contingent










where now b(st) denotes the amount of state-uncontingent debt owed to the rest of the world
by the country in period t and q(st) denotes the corresponding price. The collateral constraint
7then becomes
b(s
t) ≤ V (st+1) for all st+1. (14)














With this setup, the analog of Proposition 1 immediately applies. In particular, in the
prototype economy, ﬂuctuations in the government consumption wedge play the same role as
ﬂuctuations in net exports in the original economy.
II. A Quantitative Analysis of a Sudden Stop
Here we use the logic of Proposition 1 to examine the quantitative eﬀects of a well-
known sudden stop episode, in Mexico in the mid-1990s.
In Figure 1, we plot Mexican data on real net exports and the government consumption
wedge (the sum of real government consumption and real net exports) between the last
quarters of 1994 and 1996. We normalize both series by the level of real GDP in 1994:4. The
ﬁgure shows an abrupt and dramatic increase in the government consumption wedge in the
ﬁrst quarter of 1995 and suggests that this increase was due almost entirely to the sharp rise
in net exports. That is, Mexico experienced a sudden stop.
We study the quantitative eﬀects of this sudden stop in a prototype growth model. We
use a version of the model in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004), in which the stochastic
processes for the government consumption wedge, the labor wedge, the eﬃciency wedge, and
the investment wedge are estimated using the model and Mexican data from 1980:1 to 2003:4.
(For details, see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2005.)
8To assess the eﬀects of the sudden stop, we feed the realized values of the Mexican
government consumption wedge over the period from 1994:4 to 1996:4 into our prototype
growth model, holding the values of the other Mexican wedges ﬁxed at their 1994:4 levels.
Figure 2 shows the result: Given that historical Mexican data, the model predicts that the
sudden stop, by itself, leads to a small increase in output. Figure 2 also shows what actually
happened to Mexican real GDP in 1995: it fell sharply. This analysis clearly demonstrates
that the sharp output drop is not due to the sudden stop alone.
III. Other Frictions
We have shown that in our simple model with a collateral constraint on foreign bor-
rowing, sudden stops do not lead to output drops. Now we consider adding other frictions
to the simple model and ask if sudden stops, interacting with these frictions, lead to output
drops. We ﬁrst consider an economy with an endogenous collateral constraint and show that
this constraint corresponds to a subsidy to investment in the prototype growth model and,
therefore, to an increase in output. We then consider the role of an advance-payment con-
straint. We show that such a constraint can lead to output drops from sudden stops only
when coupled with yet other frictions.
A. Investment Wedges from Endogenous Collateral Constraints
Consider a version of the original economy with one change, that the collateral con-








Here the maximal amount that can be borrowed, V (k(st),s t+1), depends on the capital
stock chosen in period t and the shock in period t +1 . We assume that V (k(st),s t+1) is
9strictly increasing in k, so that having more collateral allows a country to borrow more, and
that V (k(st),s t+1) is uniformly bounded above, to avoid Ponzi schemes. This formulation is
similar to that of Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (1997) and is motivated by the idea
that a portion of the capital stock can eﬀectively be seized by foreign lenders in the event of
default; hence, foreign lenders will not lend more than the value of the seizable portion.
An equilibrium in this endogenous collateral-constraint economy is deﬁned as before.
The ﬁrst-order conditions here are the same as in the original economy except that the





















The associated prototype economy has an investment wedge 1 − τk(st), resembling
a tax on capital income, along with the government consumption wedge. The consumers’





























and the resource constraint is unaﬀected. An equilibrium of the prototype economy is deﬁned
as before.
The following proposition shows that the endogenous collateral constraint manifests
itself as an investment wedge in the associated prototype economy:
Proposition 2. Consider an equilibrium for the endogenous collateral-constraint economy. Let






let T(st) be deﬁn e db y( 1 8 ) ,a n dl e tt h er e s to ft h ev a r i a b l e sb ea si nP r o p o s i t i o n1 .T h e n
the resulting allocations, prices, and wedges are an equilibrium for the associated prototype
economy.
The proof of the proposition follows immediately from a comparison of the ﬁrst-order
conditions, budget constraints, and resource constraints of the two economies.
Note that if the endogenous collateral-constraint economy is in the neighborhood of a
steady state, then Fk(st+1) − δ is positive, so that in this neighborhood, a binding collateral
constraint (µ(st+1) > 0) corresponds to a subsidy to capital accumulation (τk(st+1) < 0). The
intuition for this result is that if the collateral constraint in the original economy is binding
in period t +1 , then capital accumulation in period t helps to relax the collateral constraint
in period t +1and, hence, provides an additional beneﬁt beyond that from the marginal
product of capital.
Consider a sudden stop in the endogenous collateral-constraint economy generated
by a tightening of the collateral constraint. Proposition 2 shows that such a sudden stop
corresponds to a subsidy to capital accumulation along with an increase in government con-
sumption. A well-known result in the business cycle literature is that a subsidy to capital
accumulation stimulates investment and output. We have already argued that an increase
in government consumption also stimulates output. Thus, in the endogenous collateral-
constraint economy, sudden stops do not lead to output drops.
B. Labor and Eﬃciency Wedges from an Advance-Payment Constraint
11The literature on sudden stops has introduced various forms of constraints involving
payments in advance and has shown that sudden stops interacting with these constraints and
other frictions can produce output drops. Neumeyer and Perri (2004) introduce advance-
payment constraints on wages, together with an escrow provision, and Christiano, Gust,
and Roldos (2004) and Mendoza (2004) introduce them on payments of intermediate goods.
Christiano, Gust, and Roldos subject these payments to collateral constraints. Mendoza has
both an escrow provision and a collateral constraint. Here we introduce an advance-payment
constraint on wages and show that alone it does not produce simultaneous sudden stops and
output drops.
In the business cycle literature, it has been widely argued that requiring ﬁrms to pay
workers in advance of production introduces a wedge between the marginal product of labor
and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption; we have called this a
labor wedge (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2004). Here we argue that such a requirement,
by itself, does not introduce a labor wedge, but it does so when coupled with a requirement
that ﬁrms escrow future wages in non—interest-bearing accounts.
Consider the following deterministic version of our economy with an advance-payment
constraint together with an escrow provision. In this economy, in period t − 1, a ﬁrm must
escrow with the government its wage bill wtlt due in period t. To do so, the ﬁrm borrows wtlt
at t − 1 from foreign lenders at the world (gross) interest rate Rt and escrows these funds
with the government. (Note that the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows in period t − 1 with respect to these
transactions net out to zero.) In period t, the ﬁrm uses the escrowed funds to pay its workers,
and it must repay the foreign lenders Rtwtlt. The ﬁrm’s problem is to maximize proﬁts at t
12given by
F(kt,l t) − Rtwtlt − rtkt.




tU(ct,l t) subject to the budget constraint
ct + Rtbt + kt ≤ wtlt +[ rt +( 1− δ)]kt + bt+1 + Tt.








This economy is equivalent to a prototype economy with tax rate on labor τlt equal to
1−(1/Rt). The advance-payment constraint with an escrow provision induces a labor wedge
of 1 − τlt =1 /Rt.
To see that an advance-payment constraint, by itself, does not introduce a labor wedge,
let the government pay interest on the escrow accounts at rate Rt. Here the ﬁrms borrow
wtlt/Rt at t − 1, their problem is to maximize F(kt,l t) − wtlt − rtkt, and there is no labor
wedge.
It is easy to show that an advance-payment constraint on intermediate goods, by
itself, does not distort decisions. When coupled with other frictions, such as subjecting
advance payments to collateral constraints, these constraints on intermediate goods manifest
themselves as eﬃciency wedges that resemble shocks to total factor productivity.
IV. Conclusion
We have shown theoretically and empirically that in standard equilibrium models,
sudden stops of capital inﬂows lead to increases, not drops, in output. The key frictions that
13generate output drops in the existing literature on sudden stops are subtle ones for which so
far there is little direct evidence. Finding that evidence is a challenge for future research.
Another challenge for future research is to explore a quite diﬀerent view, one which,
in fact, reverses the causation from that in the sudden stop literature. In this alternative
view, private agents see events that lead them to predict future drops in a country’s output,
and as a result, these agents pull their capital from the country. In this view, in other words,
anticipated output drops drive the sudden stops, rather than the reverse. While this view
may seem reasonable, whether quantitative evidence can be found to support it is an open
issue.
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Figure 2. The Output Effect of a Pure Sudden Stop